BEVERLY HILLS, April 02, (THEWILL) – A former Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Ishaya Bamaiyi (retd.), has blamed a former military dictator, Ibrahim Babangida, fondly called IBB, for the indiscipline in the armed forces, adding that the now retired General posted majors and lieutenant colonels to states which were supposed to be governed by major generals and brigadiers.
Bamaiyi, who stated this in his new book, Vindication of a General, also revealed how IBB and some other former generals facilitated the emergence of a former military Head of State, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo (retd), as the country’s president in 1999.
He stated that Babangida and then Head of State, Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar (retd.); ex-minister of Defence, Theophilus Danjuma; and a former National Security Adviser, Gen. Aliyu Gusau (retd), hatched and executed the plan that facilitated Obasanjo’s return to power as a civilian president.
Bamaiyi, who served as the Chief of Army Staff between March 1996 and May 1999 after which he was imprisoned for years and tried for attempted murder, attributed his travail to his opposition to Obasanjo’s candidacy and his support for the Alliance for Democracy’s candidate in 1999 presidential election, Chief Olu Falae.
Narrating that the plot to return Obasanjo to power started shortly after Abdulsalami got into power, he alleged that Abdulsalami, on becoming the head of state, started holding secret meetings with Babangida and Gusau, on the future of the country.
His words: “Unknown to me, Gen. (Abdulsalami) Abubakar had already committed himself to Generals Babangida, T.Y.Danjuma and Aliyu Gusau on General Obasanjo’s coming in to take over from him. A proposal I totally objected to, which I told Generals Abubakar, TY Danjuma and Aliyu Gusau in very clear terms. My stand did not go (down) well with the generals and General Abubakar started feeling unsafe.
“He (Abdulsalami) was supported by some northern generals, who believed one of them would take over from Obasanjo after one term of four years. It was alleged that Obasanjo had promised Gen. Babangida that he would succeed him.”
Bamaiyi further stated that, “General Abubakar prepared and handed over his (handover) report to Gen. Obasanjo’s team, dated June 1998. This means that he prepared the report as soon as he was sworn in as the commander-in-chief in June 1998”.
On page 120 of the book, he recounted insisting on Falae when he discovered that those who annulled June 12, 1993 election wanted to ‘arrange’ a president for the South-West.
He wrote: “I decided to take Chief Olu Falae to Gen. Abubakar and only Abubakar and I discussed this issue. I do not regret that action because I was and I am convinced Falae would have done better as president of our great country. I am glad those behind Obasanjo knew better.
“This was not done because they liked Obasanjo, but because of the ambition of General Babangida to return as president after Obasanjo’s tenure.
“I believe that they saw Obasanjo as a political novice they would manipulate. They never thought they would meet a different Obasanjo from the one they had known in 1979.
“When I discovered that some people were pushing for a president from the South-West, I asked a friend, Dr. Frank Adejuwon, a minister in the Abacha cabinet, to contact Chief Falae and bring him to Abuja.
“I took Falae to Gen. Abubakar and told him that Falae was a very good candidate, if the presidency had to go to the South-West. I believe Gen. Abubakar briefed Obasanjo, which led to an unforgiving Obasanjo developing actual hatred as far as I am concerned”.
On indiscipline in the force, the former Army chief pointed out that a former Head of State, Gen. Yakubu Gowon (retd.), was the first to encounter the problem of indiscipline in the military but tried to restore discipline in the armed forces.
“The efforts were successful until 1985, when General Babangida overthrew General Buhari and declared himself President,” he said.
Explaining how Buhari’s removal by Babangida brought back indiscipline into the armed forces, he wrote, “I was then the Commander Officer Guards Battalion, Keffi. The unit was in charge of security for Abuja, and it handled General Buhari’s security anytime he was in Abuja. Discipline was thrown to the winds when General Babangida used majors to arrest Gen. Buhari, a head of state and a major general.
“These majors had known Babangida at the Defence Academy, and he mostly influenced their postings to the armoured corps. It was bad enough that junior officers were used to arrest a head of state, a major general, but these same majors were compensated by being appointed as military governors.”
“In the Army, majors are supposed to be company commanders in charge of 90 to 100 men, at best, they are battalion second-in-commands in charge of battalion training. They are supposed to run around in the field with soldiers in training,” he stated.
Writing further on indiscipline under Babangida, Bamaiyi said, “As a result of their special relationship with President Babangida, these majors had free access to the President. It got to a stage that senior officers who wanted to see the President had to go through them.
“This made some of these officers arrogant and sometimes rude and they became uncontrollable. Eventually, this attitude spread to other officers, who were close to them.”
He observed that the indiscipline continued when Babangida stepped aside as President, adding that IBB implemented one of the longest and “uncertain transition programmes in Nigeria’s history.”
“After several false declarations, President Babangida’s military administration found itself under much pressure from within and outside the country to return power to civillians,” he added.
The former Army chief disclosed that Babangida’s successor, the late Sani Abacha, was expected to hand over to the winner of the June 12, 1993 presidential election, Chief Moshood Abiola.
“Abacha did not do what MKO Abiola had expected him to do. What may not be clear to us until the fullness of time is the understanding between both generals Babangida and Abacha,” he stated.
